one day, somebody will blow the whole thing up.
- vfelice4
- 5 days ago
- 14 min read
Vincent Bertolini-Felice / 1.27.26 / “Sometimes you have to pick the gun up to put the gun down.”
-Malcolm X
A question I find myself deliberating frequently is, at what point does violence1 against the state2 become justified? It is a difficult question to ask.
A large portion of historical education in the western world is that violence against the state is seldom justified and rarely effective. Violence against “the state”3 is what led to the collapse of the Roman Empire, the ideological violence against “the state”4 of Hitler and Mao resulted in senseless atrocities. The idea of standing “in opposition” to violence against an established state is something integral to the western perception of Democracy, and specifically the United States.
In a study done by Garen J. Wintemute, M.D., a Physician and Firearms Violence Researcher for U.C Davis, a quantifiable figure of the opposition to political violence within the United States was established. Of over 8500 surveyed, over 89% responded that political violence is either never justified, or that they are not willing to commit an act of political violence.
Granted, this is a limited sample size to extrapolate to over 250 million voting age adults, although it is rare to find such universal agreement on any nature in which general political ideology is concerned. What is it then, that explains such broad opposition to political violence within the United States? To ask such a broad question yields a multi-faceted response. However, I believe the root sentiments can be reduced to a few psychological, sociological, and ideological explanations.
The psychological elements include the human aversion to violence itself. As outlined in my prior piece, the human capacity to kill is not something inherently innate, it is something trained or lost due to mental conditioning or mental illness. For the overwhelming majority that have not suffered with either of those issues, the idea of physical political violence, such as assassination, opposition is biologically programmed. Humans were not programmed to commit such grievous acts of violence, and the biological imperative is to be disgusted and frightened by such acts.
Sociologically, the theories surrounding general political violence view it as an outlying and brash behavior. A prominent theory, outlined by French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his 1893 work, The Division of Labor in Society, states, “Law and morality are the totality of ties which bind each of us to society, which make a unitary, coherent aggregate of the mass of individuals. Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral” (Durkheim 398). Essentially, the standard of law creates a certain solidarity or collective perception amongst the masses that must inherently be moral. As what has been dictated by the people, for the people, and abided by the people must be a force of good, as it unites a common social framework to accept.
From an ideological perspective, American opposition to political violence dates back to those who founded the United States. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison wrote of the dangers of factionalism, one of which is the ability to incite political violence. Prior to the outbreak of warfare, the founding fathers initiated non-violent acts of political revolution, viewing war as the last result in the battle for independence.
There exists a common notion that the authority of the government in the United States is a “passive authority.” Citizens willingly obey the authority of judicial institutions and submit to imposed standards of “normalcy” (a commitment to uphold the standard of law in regard to a social context, not exclusively judicial). An inherent presupposition of this belief is that there is no impediment to a common law freedom; that the freedom of an individual is permissible so long as it does not impede on the freedom of another. The expected repercussion for impeding the freedom of another is just and due process in which the specifics of one’s transgressions are illuminated.
The underlying belief is that the ideological framework of the American government allows a valid framework for individual freedom and acts of political violence are considered transgressions against the freedoms of others and will be met with just retribution from a fair legal system.
I hoped that in establishing a valid and solid framework for the various conceptions of opposition to political violence in America, that one could understand the basis of a revisionist antithesis that allows certain justifications for political violence.
That feels a tremendously broad and absurd statement at face value. The last piece published on this website was a thorough condemnation against political violence, citing psychological and ideological theory as proof. However, I believe the narrow scope of a responsive paper, such as my last article, does not account for certain factors.
It is undeniable that certain moral atrocities reach a point in which intervention is necessary, even if the intervening force is an act of political violence. Certain circumstances exist well outside the norms of the sociological argument against political violence, while also bypasses certain psychological warning signs, and likely beneficial to the political framework of a nation’s stability.
Consider the assassination of a rogue political leader with the capacity and intent to do damage to the global community for the sake of a singular nation. From a sociological standpoint, the norms in which dictate western democracy do not apply, meaning this opposition cannot be properly rendered.
1- Acts in which the intent is to damage, harm, or kill.
2- for the sake of this paper, "the state" includes standards of western democracy, mostly within the United States. Such as governing institutions, bureaucracies that enable daily life, and corporate entities
3- "the state" exclusively in governing and bureaucratic structures.
4- "the state" in a non-United States, western democratic structure.
In a prior piece published on this website, I spoke on the psychological circumstances that allow an average citizen to view a killing as “justified” or “more justified” (for a thorough analysis, read The Blind Shooting The Blind). One such factor that enabled violence was to view the killed as someone opposed to the killer, morally, ethically, and societally. It is evident that a violent, tyrannical, and expansive regime poses enough of a threat to western democracy to warrant warfare. If warfare in such circumstances can be justified, can the killing of its ideological leader and driving factor be justified as well?
While this debate would carry more nuance, it creates a framework in which one can psychologically fathom the killing, or inherent violence against an individual as justified. From a political standpoint, if one does not choose to abide by the frameworks of western democracy, they are not entitled to the same political exemptions from political violence as those who laid the foundation for western democracy. Revisionist leaders and ideologues have created tremendously thorough and valid oppositions to the western perception of political violence, yet from the perspective of western democracy, the flimsy foundations of western democracy are constantly at risk and must be protected from revisionist sources.
However, such circumstances are rare, and only a handful of circumstances such as this have existed that have significantly risked and upset culture, collective psyches, and the western political framework. Yet, the value in this idea is that it allows one to understand the times in which political violence may be justified.
One aspect not fully covered by this essay so far is non-individual political violence. Most of the opposing arguments and hypotheticals examined so far have involved specific acts of violence against one or a group of individuals. Although, one may see from a revisionist standpoint (such as Marxism) a justification for political violence against cultural and societal institutions without directly targeting individuals.
The basis for this belief, specifically within Marxist philosophy, was that there existed a fundamental opposition in the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, the evolution of economic theory and the consolidation of capital have created a shift in society in which, more often than not, Marx’s ideas of proletariat action unintentionally harms the proletariat.
A prudent fact examined by those within the Frankfurt School was that Marx’s reductionist theories of proletariat oppression solely stemming from class struggle and diametrically opposed interests were no longer applicable in the 20th century. Under the lens of pragmatism, critical theory, and other historically conscious philosophies, the Marxist (and Marx offshoots) that posit that there is value to the proletariat in rogue acts of political violence neglect the economic setbacks to the proletariat in a modern context.
Consider a hypothetical. In our modern times, there exists two Ford Factories in Detroit, Michigan in which workers assemble and ship vehicles to the rest of the world. The workers that occupy them are paid below a living wage and forced to work intensive labor for extensive hours with little to no hopes of mobility within their profession.
In an act of ideological and political violence, a worker burns down both factories beyond repair. The ideal in this action is that the corporation recognizes that this act is the byproduct of their refusal to accommodate for their workers, and rebuild and repair the economic structure of their company to recognize the value of their working force.
Yet this ideal is a naive hope. The expected response is that the company would relocate its bases of manufacturing to a place in which labor, construction, and maintenance are cheaper. For the working class, they recognize the pains of their labor yet cling to it, as their underpaid jobs in skilled labor are preferable to nothing.
Even peaceful forms of opposing action to the economic standard of the 21st century, such as strikes, have lost their impact. Every United States presidential administration, dating back to Richard Nixon, has directly involved in union breaking across national and private industry. Beyond government interference, strikes risk the possibility of outsourcing labor, and lost jobs.
This was something outlined by Herbert Marcuse, a prominent German philosopher of the Frankfurt School. Marcuse wrote in his 1967 essay, The Problem of Violence and of Radical Opposition, “Today radical opposition can be considered only in a global framework. Taken as an isolated phenomenon its nature is falsified from the start.”
To Marcuse, and Marx itself, premature, isolated violence that neglects the value of global revolution was negligent. A necessary step for the capitalist institution to crumble was mass consciousness, a thorough understanding by the masses that the purpose of political violence is to directly overthrow the state and not claw at its sturdy legs.
Hence, individual acts of violence and localized revolt (barring extreme repression outside the bounds of laissez faire capitalism) were ineffectual and inherently contradictory to the anti-capitalist effort.
Now this poses an interesting question. One of the main revisionist theories opposed to western democracy would also not see value in the sort of brash and individual acts of political violence that I previously wrote on. In fact, both western perceptions and revisionist theories seem to agree the only times in which political violence is justified (at the individual level) is when human rights are infringed upon by a significant threat to the global community.5
However, I believe that in looking at the intersections of these perspectives on violence against the state from an individual level, it is possible to develop a moral framework on when violence may be justified.
Take the broadest hypothetical, the assassination of an authoritarian leader infringing on human rights and committing acts of state-enforced terrorism. Imagine a single man set out with the goal of assassinating Slobodan Milošević, Enver Hoxha, or Augusto Pinochet.4 This person would be regarded as a hero for killing somebody who was directly responsible for the death of innocents, drove more into poverty, and infringed upon basic, inalienable rights.
Despite the previous oppositions to killing, most would agree it is better to take violent action against such deplorable conditions rather than submit passively to atrocities. Yet, the justification for most comes in the fact that the person killed is directly responsible for said conditions. They had authority over the state and made a direct decision to commit these actions, hence they bear the responsibility for violent repercussion.
What about when a person is not directly responsible? It must be said, that there most circumstances that are several degrees of responsibility removed, and accidental death causers are exempt from this idea.
5- There exists some discrepancies in what is considered a threat to the global community by these mutually exclusive philosophies. However, I chose to stick by the standard outlined in the western perception that revisionist beliefs support.
Imagine for a moment, that the Supreme Court rules on a case that determines that the mandatory retirement age for long-haul truckers ought to be seventy, due to an increased scale of accidents from elderly truck drivers. Legislation then allows for insurance companies to drop long-haul truckers from their healthcare plans once they reach this mandatory retirement age. As a result, hundreds of truckers die from treatable conditions every year due to not having proper healthcare coverage. Would the Supreme Court justices be responsible for this? I would argue not, the avoidable death of many was the byproduct of legislation enabling insurance companies to cause such conditions.
What about the insurance companies, though? An insurance company would make a calculated decision, based on statistical and empirical analysis, that certain people on a policy would immediately lose their ability to pay for said policy, and make a broad decision to remove them. Another factor would be the analysis of the cost of procedures and treatment for retirees who are at higher risk for cardiovascular, respiratory, and other conditions; it is not profitable to allow those without the means to buy into a policy that would likely cost the company more. Hence, the need for lobbying legislation to allow wage and age-based discrimination.
Prior to the conclusion of this argument, I feel the need to establish that this hypothetical is reductive. However, it is not an inaccurate depiction of the model insurance companies use to determine what clientele is profitable and find legal mechanisms to justify removing those that are not profitable from their policies.
Did the insurance company in this hypothetical, not make an intentional, calculated decision to remove one of an inalienable right to the sustainment of life. Some may argue with the conclusion that the sustainment of life, via healthcare, is an inalienable right. Suppose then, one suffers a heart attack, and is driven into poverty because they lack insurance, is their lack of insurance not directly responsible for their poverty? Is the insurance company not directly responsible for their lack of insurance?
So, at minimum they ought to be considered responsible for their descent into poverty. What about their death directly? Not merely the idea that they deprived someone of a right. Within the United States, insurance companies are given veto power over life-saving treatment and surgeries for their clients. Howard Ankin, a Chicago Lawyer for over thirty years, wrote on the ramifications of this practice, opining, “Thousands of people throughout the United States are suffering needlessly, and many have died, because the lifesaving treatments their doctors ordered were denied by their health insurance companies.”
Ankin wrote on the nature of why this is the case, “Insurance companies are for-profit companies. Their first priority is not the insured. It is their own bottom line. They take their own financial position so seriously, in fact, that they put their company’s profits ahead of the lives of our loved ones.”
If then, one is denied life-saving treatment for the sake of a bottom line, is that not considered a calculated decision to cause someone’s death for ulterior benefit. Does the ulterior benefit of a bottom line justify the death of another?
The flawed nature of capitalism is one many often shrug at. However, is the prioritization of a bottom line, of a for-profit entity, over human life, something to just shrug at? Is it capable of being swept under the rug as not worthy of retribution? I would argue that such a circumstance as this, is not only worthy of retribution but possibly worthy of violence.
If an entity, government, or company acts in opposition to human rights, dictates policy or action that enables the death of innocents for the sake of profit, or drives thousands into poverty, should retribution that causes the entity to crumble or at minimum, to change ideology, not be heralded.
Perhaps this is a reductionist claim. To call an insurance company inherently and objectively evil to the same manner one would be a dictator, is incorrect, and lacks nuance. To call for abject violence against the entities previously outlined is wrong and creates another dilemma of one person’s subjective morality becoming the standard.
However, there are certain objective aspects that would improve how society functions; such as not standing in opposition to human rights, prioritizing human life over profit motive, and alleviating poverty. I believe there are certain objective aspects and manners in which political violence is conducted, that serve benefit to society.
While I do not believe in the assassination of influential figures and leaders of organizations that stand in opposition to the betterment of society, I believe something important was learned from the killing of United Healthcare CEO, Brian Thompson.
When Luigi Mangione was first arrested, his motives were entirely unknown, with some theorizing that it was an act of white-collar crime. However, once it became apparent that this was a retribution killing in response to a policy of United Healthcare that limited reimbursement for surgical anesthesia, several companies walked back similar policies.
Less than two weeks after his assassination, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States, announced they would no longer move forward with a similar plan.
While Anthem BCBS stated that their change in policy was in response to protests and the response from policy holders, I have an alternate theory on why such policy was enacted. It is rare that consumer feedback and protest has a significant impact with for-profit entities, in terms of policy alterations, unless the entity is caught with a smoking gun (think of the Ford Pinto, FTX, or AIG).
Rather, insurance companies were intimidated. There is nothing the state, and entities who uplift it, fears more than a population base that proves they are willing to stand by their beliefs in blood. When the state is forced to grapple with a population that is so adamant in their opposition to cracks at the decaying plaster of society, that they are willing to die fighting it, they are forced to cave.
The same opposition to political violence outlined, in upsetting norms and standards of society, is precisely why the state is forced to respond to it. When one person commits a localized act of general violence for an ideology, they are either a martyr or a criminal. For the state, they label the perpetrator as a criminal, misled, and completely isolated.
Such acts convince many that political violence is never justified. As the perception of the act is that it was an isolated individual dying for ill-informed reasons. The truth is, it will always remain at such. Until the day in which collective and effective action can be taken against the state.
Political violence will always be an atrocity until large groups are capable of taking effective action against institutions that stand in opposition to the betterment of society.
The question I attempted to answer in this paper, was whether political violence against the state is ever justified? I examined the opposition from the sociological, psychological, and ideological perspective in order to understand why so many Americans are opposed to it. Certain revisionist theorists challenged this perspective but stood behind it only in grave circumstances at a local level, or when it has the power to cause global revolution against the current system of capital.
I am unfortunately aware of where I stand on this bleak debate. Rarer has a time in all of humanity existed in which the global revolution the revisionists spoke of was ever more justified, however, I know feel that it will never be recognized.
We have been drugged by the forces of modernity. I am not blameless of this. I find the same complacency and apathy I chastise in others flourishes in me when I think of upsetting the status quo. I will die with political violence never being justified. I will die with the status quo, and the status quo will die long past me.
However, the status quo will die. The state that, for decades, has reduced the inalienable rights of the masses, condemned millions to poverty, and directly or indirectly caused the death of many, will crumble one day.
The day in which the ashes of the state are cast away in the wind, it will have been through political violence. It will have been the acts of a few individuals, inspiring a group, enabling the masses to understand something that modernity has blinded us to. Matters are worsening, and will continue to worsen, so long as our standards of what justifies political violence are dictated by the status quo, and by standards of morality that reward complacency, and neglect the cause of our problems.